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REVIEWED BY This eclectically eccentric collection of essays professes to
Michael L. be, according to the dust cover, "an introduction to current
Perlin, Esq. work and thinking in psychology and law in [Great Brit-
ain]." That it may be, but if it has, in fact, met its self-set
goal, its most important lesson may be that law and psychol-
ogy in the empire are not all they should be.
This should not be read as a dismissal of the entire volume;
there are some interesting essays, some provocative ones,
and some informative ones. (There are also some irrelevant
ones which seem to have arisen from the "I'm-doing-a-
book- and-why- don't-you-write-me-a-chapter- on-whatever-
you-want" school of editing.) The problem lies in what
appears to be missing from the volume entirely: any thought
as to how psychology may be employed in the courtroom in
any and all aspects of public interest or civil rights law. This
omission is the shocker, and is the memory that lingers on
after the book is read.
The editor poses her central question-Does psychology
have a practical contribution to make to the law?-in an
opening essay, and concludes that "recent developments are
extremely promising," that progress is being made, and that
she expects "a much closer rapprochement between law and
psychology" in the future. (p. xviii) The subsequent essays,
unfortunately, do not bring much life to her promise.
The collection is really five barely-connected sections: one
on the reliability of eyewitness evidence, one on confessions
and police interrogation, one on the psychologist as expert,
one on legal language and communication, and one pastiche
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on "applications of psychology in areas of substantive law,"
a catchall title for five mostly unrelated pieces on child
placement, interfamilial violence, gambling, traffic offenses
and legislating sexual behavior. Too often, the value of the
essays lies not in what they have to say about the topic
purportedly central to the preparation of the book, but in
their inclusion of what college professors used to call
"cepts": isolated, interesting freestanding bits of knowledge.
Thus, an essay on "Police Interrogation and Confessions"
cites two scholarly authorities for the proposition that the
"compulsion to confess" (first identified by Reik) is ap-
parently more prevalent among Roman Catholics. (p. 49)'
We learn from "Introducing Psychological Evidence in the
Courts: Impediments and Opportunities" that, in English
practice, while the Crown must divulge its medical experts'
reports to the defendant, the obligation is unilateral: the
defendant need not share his reports with the Government,
and, aside from alibi, "is usually able to spring whatever
surprises [he] likes." (p. 97)2 An interesting but not particu-
larly germane essay called "Is Legal Jargon a Restrictive
Practice?" teaches that, in reading two sentences of equal
word length, people take longer to read sentences with more
prepositions in them. (p. 127) Perhaps the most provocative
essay in the volume-a revisionistic critique of Beyond the
Best Interests of the Child 3-likens both lawyers and psy-
chologists to Mayan high priests in the way they deal with
knowledge/power issues in cases involving the disposition of
unwanted children. (p. 149)1 And so on.
Although these bits of information are interesting (and may
be worth assimilating into our unconscious corpus of knowl-
edge), they do not seem to answer the question posed
initially by the~author. Rather, they reflect a basic flaw of the
book: it remains a disorganized collection of writings
without a sorely-needed central focus. The major fault,
though, is not the organization, but the lack of attention
paid to the type of situation in which a new partnership
between law and psychology is being forged regularly in
American courts and in which there is a new "rapproche-
ment": cases involving the public interest.
In an earlier essay on "The Legal Status of the Psychologist
in the Courtroom,"5 the reviewer noted that psychologists
were beginning to become "courtroom-oriented, ' 6 and had
thus started to testify in matters such as right to education,,
right to habilitation,8 and right to vote.' The prediction that
these new roles would continue to expand has since been
borne out: psychological testimony has been crucial in more
recent cases involving the right of patients to work and to be
paid for their work,'0 their right to be deinstitutionalized in
adequate community facilities," their right to due process in
disciplinary decisions, 2 and the right of a mentally handi-
capped person to due process in any decision made as to
whether or not she need be sterilized against her will. 3 Such
contributions made by psychology to the law are of a very
different type than those which study patterns of traffic
offenses in an effort to determine if the perceived serious-
ness of the offense correlated positively with the offender's
sex and age. (p. 203) One opens up new professional vistas
as a reflection of the unique contributions psychologists can
make to the courtroom process;"' the other merely pours old
wine into a slightly newer bottle.
It is not clear where the blame lies. It is entirely conceivable
that there are no British counterpart decisions to the ones
discussed above. If that is so, however, it would seem
reasonable that the editor would either (1) discuss this
phenomenon in light of the change in American practice, or
(2) ask her contributors to analyze some of the recent
American decisions and their implications for British prac-
tice. This is no xenophobic criticism, but is directed at the
publishers: since an American distributor was chosen, the
inference is that there is an expected American market.
Without the type of analysis suggested above, that market, it
is feared, will be somewhat lacking.
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